2009-03-05

ACIDENTES: o caso do "Cosco Busan" (2)




O National Transportation Safety Board realizou uma investigação do acidente, cujas conclusões foram publicadas no dia 18 de fevereiro e estavam inéditas em português.

Entre as centenas de arquivos e páginas relativos à colisão, um bom ponto para começar a análise do acidente é a reconstituição dos movimentos do navio e dos diálogos durante os minutos que precederam o choque.

Para facilitar o entendimento da ocorrência, o NTSB produziu duas animações. A primeira é uma reconstrução 2-D em fast-time (20 vezes a velocidade real) da manobra, desde o final da desatracação até um pouco depois do acidente. A segunda alinha em tempo real os eventos relevantes ocorridos entre 0826 e 0830 h, fase mais crítica da manobra, com transcrições das falas de maior importância e imagens do radar cujos dados foram salvos no VDR (Voyage Data Recorder, a "caixa-preta" dos navios)

Veja as animações em http://www.ntsb.gov/Events/2009/San-Francisco-CA/AnimationDescription.htm

Eis a íntegra, em inglês, do áudio correspondente à animação em tempo real (a segunda animação da página):
  • This animation is a real time presentation of the Cosco Busan allision with the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge from 08:26 to 08:30.
  • The ship completed its port turn and was on heading 245 degrees, the pilot ordered the rudder to starboard to commence a turn to starboard.
  • The pilot increased the rate of turn to starboard with a rudder order of twenty degrees and, shortly afterward, an engine order of full ahead.
  • The radar screen capture indicates that the VRM circle which was set at .33 miles is moving away from the edge of Yerba Buena Island.
  • The ship’s speed over ground is 10.8 knots.
  • The VTS operator monitoring the Cosco Busan’s transit through the harbor became concerned with the position of the ship and called the pilot using his designator Romeo.
  • The pilot responded to VTS saying, traffic romeo.
  • The pilot ordered a reduction in the starboard rudder angle from twenty degrees to ten degrees, at this time the ship’s heading was about 261 degrees and its course over ground was about 235 degrees.
  • VTS asked the pilot to clarify his intentions.
  • The pilot responded to VTS that he was coming around and he was steering 280.
  • The pilot ordered an increase in the rudder angle to starboard 20.
  • VTS asked if he still intended to pass under the delta – echo span of the bridge.
  • The pilot asked the master if a point on the electronic chart was the center of the bridge, and he responded in the affirmative.
  • The pilot increased the rudder from 20 degrees to hard starboard and called VTS saying that he still intended to use the delta echo span.
  • The pilot ordered the rudder to be centered.
  • The pilot then ordered the rudder to starboard 20.
  • The pilot ordered the rudder hard to starboard.
  • The ships bosun, who was on the bow of the ship, radioed the bridge calling their attention to his sighting of the bridge column.
  • The master stated that he also saw the bridge column.
  • The pilot said he saw the bridge column.
  • As the ship’s port side came in contact with the fendering system at the base of the delta tower, the pilot ordered the rudder to be centered, and then hard to port.
  • As the ship cleared the fendering system the pilot order the rudder to be centered and ship’s speed to be slowed.
  • The pilot called the VTS operator to report the accident and stated that he was taking the ship to a nearby anchorage.

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